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APPORTIONMENT OF THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX
-With

Particular Reference to the Estate
of a Maryland Decedent*

By

GEORGE GUMP**

Nothing could be more superfluous than an extended
discussion of the serious depletion of large and even moderate estates caused by the imposition of the Federal estate
tax.' Not only the members of the Bar, but laymen as
well, have become increasingly more tax conscious since
Pearl Harbor, as a natural result of the increases and proposed further increases of rates of Federal taxation. Not
so well known, but equally as important in many cases
to the individuals concerned, are the problems which arise
with regard to the apportionment of the burden of Federal estate tax among the respective beneficiaries of the
decedent's bounty, whether such beneficiaries be legatees,
devisees, heirs, next of kin, joint tenants, appointees,
donees under inter vivos conveyances and contracts, or
beneficiaries of insurance policies.
* Without the invaluable collaboration of Morton P. Fisher, Esq., of
the Baltimore City Bar this article would never have been completed.
The author left the manuscript in a half finished state. Mr. Fisher revised and edited the original draft and made extensive corrections and
additions. The author wishes to express his grateful acknowledgment
and his sincere appreciation for the time and thought which Mr. Fisher
so kindly and generously gave to the preparation of this article.
** Of the Baltimore City Bar. A.B., 1930, Johns Hopkins University;
LL.B., 1933, University of Maryland. Lecturer on Taxation and Future
Interests (on leave), University of Maryland School of Law. Lieutenant
(J.G.) U. S. N. R.
The opinions and assertions in this article are the private ones of the
writer and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of
the Navy Department or the Naval Service at large.
I Under Secretary Morgenthau's recommendation dated March 3, 1942,
the proposed tax on a net estate of $100,000 will be $29,350; on a net estate
of $1,000,000 the tax will be $553,350 (both computed on net estates after
allowance of specific exemption).
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I. AN EXAMPLE.
Perhaps the scope of this article can be best delineated
and limited by example. Let us assume the existence of
a hypothetical taxpayer having as the natural objects of
his bounty four sons, by name Daniel, Paul, Robert and
LeRoy.2 We may further assume a natural desire on the
part of the parent to benefit his sons equally upon his death.
Let us endow our hypothetical benefactor with a taxable
estate of $400,000.00, 3 equally divided as among (1) a trust
estate created by him in his lifetime in which he has
retained the income for life, (2) personal property devolving upon his executor by will, (3) real property passing
on his death directly to the devisee thereof, and (4) taxable
life insurance. 4 For reasons best known to himself, we
will assume that our decedent has, by deed of trust and
by will, devoted each of the four types of property under
his control to one of his four sons, so that Daniel will
receive the trust estate, Paul the personal property, Robert
the real property and LeRoy a check from the insurance
company, each of the value of $100,000.00,1 less, of course,
the Federal estate tax thereon, which will aggregate, under
the recently proposed rates, approximately $176,000.00.
The payment of this bill of $176,000.00 which will be
presented to the Executor, will cause the four sons more
than a passing thought. If divided proportionately among
their respective portions, it will reduce each by more than
40%, but if the tax bill is not divided proportionately, if
payment ultimately is made out of one's share alone, the
unlucky child will be completely denuded of all share
in the estate. If it be divided among two of the four, each
2 The initials of the hypothetical offspring are designed to indicate the
type of disposition made by the father in their favor, namely: Daniel takes
under a Deed of Trust; Paul receives Personal property; Robert receives
Real property; and LeRoy Is the beneficiary of Life insurance policies.
I For purposes of simplification, all figures as to values of property
subject to the tax will be considered as being net after payment of debts,
administrative expenses, deduction of specific exemption, etc. Thus the
life insurance and the personal property will each be considered as having
a gross value of $140,000, aillowing in each case for the present $40,000
exemption.
I It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the types or inter vivos
conveyances and contracts subject to the Federal estate tax. Our example
presupposes that taxable types only are involved.
See supra, notes 2 and 3.
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of the more fortunate will receive a net $100,000.00, while
the others will benefit only to the tune of approximately
$12,000.00 each.'
The testator, or grantor, may cover the question of
apportionment in the instrument itself by explicit provisions, at least to the extent that he may wish to vary
from the apportionment which would otherwise result
from the provisions of the statute. It is to be noted, however, that his power to depart from the apportionment
statute is for the most part, limited to the relief of a
beneficiary from the effect of apportionment, and he will
be unable, in many instances, directly to impose apportionment on beneficiaries who would not otherwise be
liable to contribute.7 Often, however, express directions
in the instrument will avoid the confusion resulting from
the present state of the statutory law.
II.

FEDERAL AND MARYLAND STATUTES.

Both Congress and the General Assembly of Maryland
have dealt with the apportionment of Federal estate taxes
as between the executor on the one hand and the beneficiaries whose title does not derive through the executor
on the other hand. Unfortunately the solons in Washington and those in Annapolis have not seen eye to eye. The
Federal Collector looks to the executor for payment in
the first instance.8 If the executor does not make the
6

]bid.

Both the Federal and Maryland apportionment statutes are effective
only in the event the decedent fails to express a contrary intention. It is
submitted, however, that such a contrary intention contemplates, in many
instances, only relief from apportionment. It necessarily follows that
relief of one beneficiary results in imposition of the tax upon another
(because, of course, the tax collector will not permit avoidance of the
payment of the tax); but at least in the absence of express statutory
authority, the decedent would appear to have no power to Impose apportionment upon property or interests not passing under the will, which
would not otherwise be subject to such burden. A decedent could not impose apportionment upon a surviving joint owner or owner by the entireties
or (unless by statute) upon a transferee of a completed gift. Naturally,
there are circumstances where this might be accomplished indirectly, such
as where the decedent makes beneficial provisions in his will for the surviving joint owner or transferee conditioned upon payment of a portion of
Federal estate taxes. Such a practical solution, however, has no effect
upon the principle herein suggested.
8 Internal Revenue Code. Section 822(b): "Liability for payment-The
tax imposed by this sub-chapter shall be paid by the executor to the Collector."
7
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required payment, the Collector may enforce a lien for
the tax against the estate administered by the executor,9
and if still not satisfied, may enforce the lien on the property passing to a beneficiary other than through the hands
of the Executor. 10 Personal liability also exists if the
property is dissipated by the executor or transferee without payment of the tax." These provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code are designed to insure the collection of the
tax. They do not govern the question of apportionment
as between respective interests, once the tax has been paid.
The apportionment provisions of the Federal law are found
elsewhere in the Internal Revenue Code,12 and are contrasted herein side by side with the Maryland Legislation 3
on the subject, as follows:
Internal Revenue Code,
Section 826
"( b ) Reimbursement
out of estate-If the tax
or any part thereof is paid
by, or collected out of that
part of the estate passing
to or in the possession of,
any person other than the
executor in his capacity
as such, such person shall
be entitled to reimbursement out of any part of
the estate still undistributed or by a just and
equitable contribution by
the persons whose interest in the estate of the
decedent would have been
reduced if the tax had
been paid before the distribution of the estate or
whose interest is subject

Maryland-Article 81,
Section 126
"Whenever it appears
upon any accounting, or
in any appropriate action
or proceeding, that an executor, administrator,
trustee or other person
acting in a fiduciary capacity, is liable for the
payment of tax under the
provisions of the United
States Revenue Act of
1926, or any amendments
thereto, or under any
death tax law of the
United States hereafter
enacted, upon or with respect to any property required to be included in
the gross estate of a decedent under the provisions of any such law, the

0Internal Revenue Code, Section 827(a).
11 1. R. C., Section 827(b).
11 R. S., Section 3467 (as amended by Section 518 (a) of the Revenue Act
of 1934) ; I. R. C., Section 827(b).
12 . R. C., Section 826(b) and 826(c).
"' Md. Code (1939) Art. 81, Sec. 126, enacted by Md. Laws 1937, Ch. 546.

1942]

ESTATE TAX

to equal or prior liability amount of the tax, except
for the payment of taxes, in a case where a testator
debts, or other charges otherwise directs in his
against the estate, it being will, shall be equitably
the purpose and intent of pro-rated as between the
this subchapter that so far individual estate of the
as is practicable and un- decedent and the trust esless otherwise directed by tates created, or transfers
the will of the decedent made, by the decedent in
the tax shall be paid out his life time so included
of the estate before its dis- in said gross estate, and
tribution.
the fiduciary paying the
"(c) Liability of Life tax shall be entitled to reInsurance Beneficiaries- cover from the fiduciaries
If any part of the gross in possession of said trust
estate consists of proceeds estates and from the
of policies of insurance transferees, the proporupon the life of the deced- tionate amount of such
ent receivable by a bene- tax with which such funds
ficiary other than the ex- are chargeable under the
ecutor, the executor shall provisions of this section.
be entitled to recover
"The provisions of this
from such beneficiary section shall apply to essuch portion of the total tates of persons dying subtax paid as the proceeds, sequent to June 1, 1937."
in excess of $40,000, of
such policies bear to the
net estate. If there is
more than one such beneficiary the executor shall
be entitled to recover
from such beneficiaries in
the same ratio."
Certain likenesses and certain irreconcilable conflicts
appear at once from a comparison of the respective Federal and Maryland statutes. Both defer to the wishes of
the testator, the Federal statute being made effective only
"unless otherwise directed by the will of the decedent" ,14
while the Maryland Act applies "except in a case where
"Note that this phrase only appears in Section 826(b) and does not
appear in Section 826(c), which later Section deals with insurance.
Quaere, therefore, whether the will of a decedent, no matter how explicit,
is effective to change the Federal rule as to apportionment of tax on life
insurance proceeds. See also supra, n. 7.

200
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a testator otherwise directs in his will". 15 It will further
be noted that neither enactment deals expressly with apportionment or lack of apportionment as between various
beneficiaries of the decedent's bounty all of whom acquire
title through the executor; the problem of apportionment
as between specific legatees on the one hand and residuary
legatees on the other hand is not dealt with specifically. 6
Here the likenesses stop. The differences are much more
marked.
The theory, purpose and effect of the Federal and Maryland statutes are diametrically opposed to one another.
Congress has imposed the entire burden of the tax upon
that portion of the taxable estate passing to the executor
(except as to life insurance proceeds), and has blessed
other transferees with the power to require reimbursement
from the executor; the General Assembly has favored the
principle of an equitable distribution of the burden, and
has endowed the executor with right of contribution
against certain classes of transferees.
III.

THE

APPLICATION OF THE STATUTES TO THE EXAMPLE

The application of Federal and Maryland statutes to
our hypothetical estate reveals the conflicts between the
two enactments and serves to illustrate the uncertainty
of the subject.
Our executor owes roughly $176,000.00 in Federal estate
tax. He only has $100,000.00 in his hands with which to
pay, so first of all, Paul's $100,000.00 of personal property
must go with the proverbial wind. The executor must
still collect an additional $76,000.00. If he follows the
principle of the Federal Act, he will turn first to LeRoy
and require him to deliver up a portion of his life insurance
15 Note that both the Federal and Maryland Acts allow the testator's
intent to govern when such intent is expressed in a will. Quaere, the effect
of an expression of intention in an inter vivos deed of trust if there be no
will, or if the will is silent. See also supra, n. 7.
'" Estate of J. Del Drago, 287 N. Y. 61, 38 N. E. (2d)
131 (1941), motion
for reargument denied, 40 N. E. (2d) 46 (N. Y. 1942), and certiorari
granted, 62 S. Ct. 918, 86 L. Ed. 810 (U. S. 1942), is to the contrary as
respects the Federal Statute. See Matter of Hamlin, 226 N. Y. 407, 124
N. E. 4 (1919), cert. den. 250 U. S. 672 (1919). See also discussion,
Section VI of this article, infra.
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proceeds under the authority of Section 826(c) of the
Internal Revenue Code; but this Section by its terms, only
permits recovery from LeRoy of "such portion of the total
tax paid as the proceeds, in excess of $40,000.00, of such
policies bear to the net estate". Thus LeRoy may be compelled to deliver up only one-fourth of the total tax, 1"
or $44,000.00.
The executor is still shy some $32,000.00. No differentiation is made in the Federal statute as between Daniel's
trust property and Robert's real estate, so presumably the
executor would require each to pay half of the balance,
or $16,000.00 each. Thus the following result would be
reached:
Beneficiary
Gross Gift
Paul ............
$100,000.00
LeRoy ..........
100,000.00
Daniel ........
100,000.00
Robert ........
100,000.00

Tax
$100,000.00
44,000.00
16,000.00
16,000.00

Net Gift
$
0.00
56,000.00
84,000.00
84,000.00

$400,000.00

$176,000.00

$224,000.00

On the other hand, if the executor follows the Maryland statute, he will first enforce pro-rata contribution
from the trust estate, thus increasing Daniel's share of
the tax from $16,000.00 to $44,000.00, and reducing the
burden on LeRoy.
If the executor enforces both the contribution provided
in the Federal statute and the contribution provided in
the Maryland statute, Robert will be required to pay no
portion of the tax at all.
Whatever action is taken by the executor, Paul must
still be content with memories of the dear departed in lieu
of cash in hand.
We have, thus far, described an executor attempting
to solve the maze on his own responsibility. A more likely
action on the part of an executor would be to petition
a Court of Equity for instructions, joining the four sons
1"See

supra, notes 2 and 3.
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as parties defendant. In such event the following conflicting legal principles would confront the Court:
1. The Federal Act places the primary liability on the
executor, with contribution proportionately from
the beneficiary of the proceeds of life insurance, and
secondary liability on other transferees indiscriminately.
2. The Maryland Act assumes the primary liability on
the executor, requires contribution proportionately
from the fiduciary of the trust estate, and does not
affect the beneficiary of the life insurance or the
devisee of the real estate.
3. The decisions of the Court of Appeals subject the
personal property to the payment of debts before
the realty.'
4. The decisions of the Court of Appeals subject the
residue to the payment of debts before specific lega19
cies.
5. There is little authority to guide the Court in determining whether the Federal or State law should
govern. °
The natural inclination of a Chancery court, it is submitted, would be to require each of the four beneficiaries
to contribute a proportionate share of the tax. Such a
result would be fair and equitable, and (perhaps it would
not be too presumptuous to suggest) would be in accord
with the intent of the decedent. Yet to require such a
proportionate and equal division of the burden of the
tax would violate most of the conceptions of the Federal
Act, the Maryland Act, and the Maryland decisions on
payment of debts of a decedent.
18 See BAGBY, MARYLAND LAW OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (2nd
Ed., 1927) Sec. 77 and cases cited.
19 See ibid., See. 78, and cases cited.
10The authorities are collected and discussed in the case of In re Estate
of J. Del Drago, supra, n. 16, and will be more fully discussed hereinafter.
See Section VI, infra.
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IV.

CRITIQUE OF THE FEDERAL LAW.

A most concise exposition of the lack of basic reasons
underlying the theory of the Federal apportionment statute was recently presented by Randolph Paul, Tax Adviser
to the Secretary of the Treasury, in a formal statement to
the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives. 2 Said Mr. Paul:
"There is no sound basis for having an express
provision, apportioning liability in regard to life insurance without similar provisions covering other
transfers subject to the estate tax."
There are two fundamental effects of the Federal apportionment act-the first is to grant contribution in favor
of the executor against a beneficiary of a life insurance
policy, and the second is to deny such contribution in favor
of the executor against anyone else. There seems to be
no sound reason why the remainderman of an inter vivos
trust subject to the tax, or a donee of a gift in contemplation of death, should escape scotfree, while the life insurance beneficiary is singled out as the sole contributor to
help ease the burden upon those recipients of the testator's
bounty who derive title through the executor. The first
criticism of the Federal Act is, therefore, the distinction
made, without apparent rhyme or reason, between life
insurance beneficiaries and other groups of beneficiaries.
A much more serious defect in the Act, it is submitted,
is the essential casting of the major burden of the tax upon
legatees taking through the executor to the exclusion of
those who acquire their title in other manners. It would
seem that in enacting any apportionment statute, the prime
motive of the legislators should be to cast the burden proportionately and equitably upon those who are to benefit
by reason of the transactions giving rise to the tax; yet
the Federal Act causes an exactly contrary result to be
reached. It would appear that the "Average Taxpayer"
making disposition of his worldly goods, would desire each
21 March 3, 1942.
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of his beneficiaries to bear his fair proportion of the tax,
in the absence, of course, of some contrary intent clearly
expressed.2 Yet the Federal Act assumes the contrary to
be true.
There is yet another objection which can be made to
the present Federal apportionment act which is directed
as well to any which may be enacted in its place. The
objection lies in there being any Federal apportionment
act at all. The Federal Government is primarily concerned
with the collection of the taxes which Congress has imposed. Once the tax is collected, the distribution of the
burden thereof as among the respective beneficiaries, is
of no particular interest to the Tax Collector. It would
seem that the rights of the respective beneficiaries of a
decedent's estate is a matter which solely concerns themselves, and which can be, and should be, adequately covered by the laws of the State in which they reside. Any
attempt on the part of the Federal Government to dictate
the manner and method of allocating the burden of the
debts of a decedent, even though those debts be created
by Federal law, would seem to be an unnecessary, although
not an unwarranted, invasion of territory naturally controllable by the State.
V.

CRITIQUE OF THE MARYLAND ACT.

The theory of the Maryland Act, it is submitted, is
good. The Act aims at an equitable and proportionate
distribution of the burden. It does not, however, go far
enough.
The Maryland Act requires contribution in favor of the
executor in cases where the decedent has created an inter
vivos trust in such manner as not to eliminate the trust
property from his taxable estate. It also probably covers
situations where the testator has made an outright gift
which is subsequently required to be included in gross
estate as a gift in contemplation of death, and therefore
22 Even the New York cases cited supra, n. 16, have no good word for
the wisdomn of the Federal Statute.
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subject to Federal estate tax. It fails to cover the proceeds
of taxable life insurance. It does not affect the appointee
under a taxable power of appointment, nor require contribution from a joint tenant or tenant by the entireties.
Finally, it fails to provide for any contribution as between
the devisee of realty and the legatee of personal property
or as between heirs and next of kin.
If a testator has created a trust in favor of A, has
designated B as the beneficiary of his life insurance, has
devised his real estate to C, has made a gift in contemplation of death to D, has appointed property to E, has had
a joint tenancy with F and has left the residue of his estate, consisting of personal property, to G, there would
seem to be no valid reason why the bulk of the Federal
estate taxes should be borne by G alone, with only a proportionate contribution from A's fiduciary and from D,
and no contribution from any of the other four.
VI.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RESPECTIVE AcTs.

The preceding discussion has demonstrated the essential conflict in theory between the Federal and State acts.
Apart from numerous other considerations, the respective
rights as between the executor of an estate and a fiduciary
holding taxable property cannot be reconciled, so long as
the two statutes remain in force. Sooner or later, the
Courts must decide which has preference.
While there have been several dicta on the topic,2 3
the only square decision is that of the New York Court
of Appeals in the case of Del Drago's Estate,2 4 decided on
November 27th, 1941. Josephine Del Drago's will provided
for several specific legacies, including one of $200,000.00
and one of $300,000.00. Her residuary estate seems to have
been large enough to absorb both Federal and State estate
taxes, amounting to over $300,000.00. Her executors requested instructions as to whether the tax should be pro
rated among the respective legatees and devisees or should
be paid entirely from the residue, the will being silent on
2 These cases are discussed more fully hereinafter.
Supra, n. 16.

21
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the point. By statute passed in 1930,25 the New York
Legislature had specifically provided for equitable apportionment as between specific legatees and residuary
legatees.
In the writer's opinion, the Del Dragocase should have
been decided without any necessity for examining the constitutional question. The issue in the case dealt with apportionment vel non, as between specific and residuary
legatees. It was unquestioned that all of the tax would
be paid from property "passing to or in the possession of"
the executor, regardless of how the case was decided. The
Federal Act does not, by any specific wording, attempt
to regulate the respective rights of residuary and specific
legatees; it merely provides for rights of contribution in
favor of. the executor where the tax is paid from a part
of the estate "passing to or in the possession of any person
other than the executor in his capacity as such"; the Federal Act requires, unless the testator otherwise directs,
the tax to be "paid out of the estate [held by the executor]
before its distribution", but it does not specifically state
which portions of the estate held by the executor shall
bear the primary burden. There is no express provision
in the Federal Act favoring specific legatees over residuary
legatees, or vice versa, so long as both classes of bene26
ficiaries receive property from the hands of the executor.
Such was the view of the minority of the Court, consisting
of three of the seven judges. Desmond J., writing for the
minority, said:27
"We see no possible conflict between the command
of the Federal estate tax statute, that unless otherwise
directed by the will, the tax be paid out of the net
estate and the provision of Section 124 that, unless
otherwise directed by the will, the tax be apportioned."
A contrary construction of the Federal Act was adopted
by the majority of the Court, it appearing to four of the
judges that the Federal Act should be construed to require
" New York Laws of 1930, Chapter. 710.
"1Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U. S. 61 (1924) ; Young Men's Christian Ass'n
of Columbus, Ohio, v. Davis, 264 U. S. 47, 50 (1924).
2738 N. E. (2d) 131, 142.
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payment by the executor from the residuary estate without contribution from the property passing to the specific
legatees. 28 Thus, by what is submitted to have been an
erroneous construction of the Federal Act, the constitutional question was squarely presented. The New York
Act unquestionably required an equitable apportionment.
The Federal Act, as construed by the majority of the
Court, denied such apportionment. The Court decided
that the New York Act, to the extent that it conflicted
with their interpretation of the Federal Act, was unconstitutional as violative of the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution.2 9 The Court therefore instructed the
executors to pay the entire tax from the residuary estate.
While, as has been indicated above, it is the writer's opinion that the Del Drago case could have and should have
been decided by construing the Federal law in a manner
which would not have conflicted with the New York Act
in the particular situation presented to the Court, nevertheless it is inevitable that situations will arise where
State apportionment acts, including the Maryland Act, will
admit of no possible reconciliation with the Federal
enactment, and will require a decision on the supremacy
of the two enactments.
There are certain fundamental principles of law which
constitute the basis for the consideration of the validity
of the respective Maryland and Federal Acts. These principles of law are first, that the State has the exclusive right
to regulate the devolution and succession of property at
death; 30 second, that the Federal Government may validly
impose death taxes, whether such taxes take the form
11 The majority rested their decision largely on the fact that the Federal
taxing statute is an estate tax imposed on the transfer rather than an
inheritance tax imposed on the respective beneficiaries. Admitting the
soundness of this distinction (New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345,
348 (1921)), there seems to be no basis for construing the Federal Act to
deny the right of State Legislatures to apportion the burden equitably in
the absence of a positive Federal command.
29 U. S. Const., Art. VI:
". . . the Laws of the Ulited States . . . shall
be the supreme Law of the Lanid."
so Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 (1900) ; Snyder v. Bettman, 190 U. S.
249, 252 (1904) ; New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, supra n. 28; Edwards v.
Slocum, 264 U. S. 61, 63 (1924); Devaughn v. Hutchinson, 165 U. S. 566
(1897).
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of an inheritance or succession tax on the right to receive
the property or an estate tax on the right to transmit the
property;"' and third, to the extent that the Federal Act may
be valid and to the extent that it conflicts with the Maryland Act, the Federal Act will govern and the Maryland
Act is invalid.2 It will be the purpose of this section of
this article to examine the validity and effect of the Federal and State apportionment acts in light of these principles.
The Supreme Court of the United States has frequently
reiterated the proposition that in the field of regulating
and controlling the dissolution and succession of property
at death, the State is supreme. In Knowlton v. Moore,
the principle was expressed as follows: 88
"Of course, in considering the power of Congress
to impose death duties, we eliminate all thought of
a greater privilege to do so than exists as to any other
form of taxation, as the right to regulate successions
is vested in the states, and not in Congress."
In Devaughn v. Hutchinson,4 the Court said:
"It is a principle firmly established that to the law
of the state in which the land is situated we must look
for the rules which govern its descent, alienation, and
transfer, and for the effect and construction of wills
and other conveyances."
Similar expressions are to be found in Edwards v.
Slocum, and New York Trust Company v. Eisner35
In spite of these clear statements of the Supreme Court
made in tax cases, the majority of the New York Court
in the Del Drago case attempted to work out a Federal
power of regulation, stating:"
"Nevertheless, every sovereignty, whether State or
Federal, possesses the power of regulating the manner
Knowlton v. Moore, supra, n. 30; New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, supra,
n. 28.
32
tpra, n. 29.
178 U. S. 41, 58.
4165 U. S. 566 (1897).
"Edwards v. Slocum, supra, n. 30; New York Trust Co. v. Eisner.
supra, n. 28.
3"38 N. E. (2d) 131, 137.
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and terms upon which property, both real and personal, within its dominion may be transmitted by will
and of prescribing who shall and who shall not be
capable of taking it."
In support of its statement, the majority of the Court
of Appeals cited numerous decisions of the Federal and
State Courts dealing almost exclusively with the power
of the Federal Government to regulate the rights of succession of aliens by treaty, and with the rights of the State
to govern alien succession apart from treaty.
It is submitted that the power of the Federal Government to effect rights of succession of aliens by treaty does
not in any manner destroy the fundamental rule that
devolution and transmission of property at death is controllable only by the State; the treaty-making power furnishes an exception to the rule, but does not affect its force
with regard to domestic legislation. No provision of the
Federal Constitution is cited by the New York Court of
Appeals and none can be cited to support the contention
that in the field of domestic legislation, the Congress has
the power to determine which citizens shall inherit property. If, therefore, the Federal apportionment statute be
regarded as an act which controls the devolution of property, and if the sole support for the act is found in some
fancied aspect of the sovereignty of the Federal Government which endows it with the right to state who shall
and who shall not be capable of inheriting property, then
it is submitted the Federal Act must fall, and conversely,
the Maryland Act is valid.
That the Federal Government may validly impose estate
and succession taxes is no longer open to doubtA The
power to levy a tax is certainly meaningless unless at
the same time the Congress may designate the person to
pay the tax. If, then, the Federal apportionment act be
deemed to be not a regulatory measure at all, but merely
a concomitant of the sections of the law imposing the tax
and determining who shall pay it, then it would seem that
For example, Mager v. Grima, 8 How. 490 (1850).
11 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, supra, n. 30; New York Trust Co. v.
Eisner, supra, n. 28.
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the Federal Act is entirely valid, and conversely, the Maryland Act must fall.
The Federal apportionment act has persisted in practically its present form since the first estate tax law,39
the Revenue Act of 1916. The constitutionality of this
first estate tax law was presented to the Supreme Court
in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner. ° In summarizing the
provisions of the first estate tax law, Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, referred to and outlined the
effect of the apportionment section in the statement of
the facts of the case. The main contention of the taxpayer was, of course, contained in the argument that the
Federal estate tax law in itself was an intrusion on the
rights of the State. The Court had little difficulty in finding this argument to be without merit, but took particular
occasion to consider the apportionment section in these
words:
"The inequalities charged upon the statute, if there
is an intestacy, are all inequalities in the amounts that
beneficiaries might receive in case of estates of different values, of different proportions between real and
personal estate, and of different numbers of recipients;
or, if there is a will, affect legatees. As to the inequalities in case of a will, they must be taken to be contemplated by the testator. He knows the law and the
consequences of the disposition that he makes. As
to intestate successors, the tax is not imposed upon
them, but precedes them; and the fact that they may
receive less or different sums because of the statute
does not concern the United States."
Long prior to the New York Trust Company case sustaining the validity of a Federal estate tax, the Supreme
Court had considered and upheld the validity of a Federal succession tax in Knowlton v. Moore."' The War Revenue Act of 189842 imposed an inheritance or succession
tax, the rates of which were in part determined by the
relationship of the legatee or devisee to the decedent, and
8939 Stat. at L. 756, 777.
40 New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, supra, n. 28.
"4Knowlton v. Moore, supra, n. 30.
" 30 Stat. at L. 448, Chapter 448.
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in part determined by the size of the amounts involved.
One of the questions to be decided by the Court was
whether the tax should be deducted from the share of
each respective beneficiary or should be paid from the
estate. The Court stated the problem as follows:
"When the rate of tax is thus calculated upon the
particular attitude to the deceased of each of the
legatees or distributees, the sum of the tax must be
deducted either from each particular legacy or from
the mass of the whole personal estate. If it is deducted
from each particular legacy, then it is manifest that
the tax imposed will have been levied, not upon the
mass of the estate, but upon each particular legatee
or beneficiary, since the share of such person will have
paid a rate of taxation predicated upon the amount
of the legacy and the relationship, or want of relationship, of the particular recipient thereof to the deceased.
This being the case, no room would be left for the
contention that the tax was imposed on the whole
estate. On the other hand, if the whole sum of the
taxation on all the shares, calculated on the basis of
the relationship of each beneficiary and the amount
received, be deducted from the mass of the estate, then
each recipient would pay only a proportion of the
amount without reference to his relationship to the
deceased. This would result in imposing the tax on
the whole personal estate, and ratably distribute the
burden among all the beneficiaries."
The conclusion reached was that the tax should be paid
by deduction from each beneficiary's share, but it is significant that the Court did not imply that any constitutional
question would have been involved had the Act compelled
a contrary construction. By implication, therefore, it may
well be contended that Knowlton v. Moore is some authority in favor of the power of Congress to determine the
incidence of the tax.
Granted, for the moment, that the Congress, having
power to levy an estate tax, also has the power to determine who shall pay it, the question arises as to whether
or not the present Federal Act is so inequitable and unjust
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as to be invalid for reasons entirely apart from and independent of any lack of the power of Congress to pass a
general apportionment law. The rates of the succession
tax involved in Knowlton v. Moore, as has been set forth
above, depended both on relationship of beneficiaries and
amounts involved. One of the questions before the Court
was the determination of whether the rates of tax were
to be computed on the entire value of the estate, or on
the value of each individual bequest. The Court put the
question in these words:
"Granting, however, there is doubt as to the construction, in view of the consequences which must result from adopting the theory that the act taxes each
separate legacy by a rate determined, not by the
amount of the legacy, but by the amount of the whole
personal estate left by the deceased, we should be
compelled to solve the doubt against the interpretation relied on. The principle on which such construction rests was thus defended in argument. The tax
is on each separate legacy or distributive share, but
the rate is measured by the whole estate. In other
words, the construction proceeds upon the assumption
that Congress intended to tax the separate legacies,
not by their own value, but by that of a wholly distinct and separate thing. But this is equivalent to
saying that the principle underlying the asserted interpretation is that the house of A, which is only worth
$1,000, may be taxed, but that the rate of the tax is
to be determined by attributing to A's house the value
of B's house, which may be worth a hundredfold the
amount. The gross inequalities which must inevitably
result from the admission of this theory are readily
illustrated. Thus, a person dying, and leaving an
estate of $10,500, bequeaths to an hospital $10,000.
The rate of tax would be 5 per cent, and the amount
of tax $500. Another person dies at the same time,
leaves an estate of $1,000,000, and bequeaths $10,000
to the same institution. The rate of tax would be 12
per cent, and the amount of the tax $1,250. It would
thus come to pass that the same person, occupying the
same relation, and taking in the same character two
equal sums from two different persons, would pay in
the one case more than twice the tax that he would
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in the other. In the arguments of counsel tables are
found which show how inevitable and profound are
the inequalities which the construction must produce.
Clear as is the demonstration which they make, they
only serve to multiply instances afforded by the one
example which we have just given.
"It may be doubted by some, aside from express
constitutional restrictions, whether the taxation by
Congress of the property of one person, accompanied
with an arbitrary provision that the rate of tax shall
be fixed with reference to the sum of the property of
another, thus bringing about the profound inequality
which we have noticed, would not transcend the limitations arising from those fundamental conceptions
of free government which underlie all constitutional
systems."
The "inequalities" foreseen by Mr. Justice White in
Knowlton v. Moore are inherent in the present Federal
apportionment act. Under our present law, if decedent X
dies, leaving all of his worldly possessions of the value
of $40,000.00 to A, there will be no tax at all. On the other
hand, if decedent Y leaves his entire estate of the same
value to B, but in addition thereto has made a gift of several hundred thousand dollars to C prior to his death, but
in contemplation of death, there will not only be a tax on
B's $40,000.00, but the tax will be in excess of 100%.
Justice White was much concerned with the possibility
that a tax might be raised from 5% to 12 % on one's
property, by "reference to the sum of the property of
another", yet if Section 826(b) is constitutional, this small
increase becomes insignificant and the "property of another" may cause one's legacy to be entirely dissipated
through taxation. We cannot lightly pass over the contention that such a "profound inequality" might "transcend
the limitations arising from those fundamental conceptions
of free government which underlie all constitutional systems."
The decisions of the Supreme Court above quoted, seem
to be determinative of the issue of the power of Congress
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to legislate on this important matter. An unquestionably
constitutional tax is levied by Congress. The burden of
the tax must be borne by some person or by some group.
Congress has therefore stated that unless the decedent
grants relief in his will, the burden shall be distributed
in the fashion set forth. It appears to the writer that
Section 826(b) does not regulate the rights of succession
or devolution, that it does not invade the rights of the
State to control succession, and that it leaves the decedent
entirely free to determine for himself who should eventually pay the tax, to the extent that he has such power
under the State law.
Reduced to its essentials, the Federal apportionment
act comes to this: A tax has been levied on transmission
of property at death. The tax is measured by various types
of gifts, the recipients of which are not always identical.
The tax must be paid and Congress has left unaffected
the right of the decedent to determine, through his will,4 3
(subject to the laws of the State), which of his property
and which of his beneficiaries shall ultimately pay it.
Congress has further stated that, if the decedent does not
see fit to express any intention, it will be presumed that
he meant certain specified classes of his property, and
consequently, certain of his beneficiaries, to share the burden of the tax, to the exclusion of the others. There seems
to be nothing unconstitutional about that; We may doubt
the wisdom of the present law, but we must recognize the
power to make it.
Based on the conclusion above reached that Section
826(b) is not open to any valid objection on constitutional
grounds, it remains to be seen whether or not the Maryland
Act is also valid. There would seem to be no possible
constitutional objection to the Maryland Act in itself, apart
from its conflict with the Federal enactment. If Congress
intended the Federal Act to be controlling, there could be
no question but that under the supremacy clause of the
Constitution, 4 the will of Congress must be enforced by
68 See, however, supra, n. 7 and n. 14.
"Supra, n. 29.
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the Courts and the Maryland Act must be declared invalid
to the extent of the conflict. Yet if the intent of Congress
in enacting Section 826 (b) was to establish a rule of apportionment only in the absence of appropriateState legislation, then, of course, the Maryland Act may be enforced.
Several expressions of the Supreme Court4 5 have been
relied upon in support of the theory that Section 826(b)
and corresponding sections in prior acts, have been intended by Congress only to apply in the event the State
has not seen fit to legislate on the subject.4 6 Reference
is here made to the quotation above from New York Trust
47
Company v. Eisner.
In Young Men's Christian Association v. Davis48 the
testator left the residue of her estate to charities. Charitable gifts were exempt from tax. Yet if 'the tax on the
specific legacies and devises were paid by the executor
out of the residue, the charities which were favored by
the law would nevertheless have been compelled to bear
the burden of the tax. The Court below49 held that the
tax should be paid from the residue, both because of the
Federal Act and because of the effect of the common law
of Ohio, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The following
statement occurs in the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Taft:
"There is nothing in subdivision (3) of Section
403 which exempts the recipients of altruistic gifts
from taxation; it only requires a deduction of them
in calculating the amount of the estate which is to
measure the tax. It exempts the estate from a tax
on what is thus deducted, just as subdivision (4) exempts in terms the estate from taxation on its first
$50,000; but this does not operate to exempt any
legatee who may be entitled to the first $50,000 in the
distribution, from deduction to contribute to the tax
ultimately imposed, if, by the law of the state, such
should be its incidence."

"New

York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 8upra, n. 28; Young Men's Christian
Ass'n of Columbus, Ohio, v. Davis, supra, n. 26.
" See the minority opinion in the Del Drago case, 38 N. E. (2d) 131, 142.
47 Supra, circa, n. 40.

"1 Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Columbus, Ohio, v. Davis, supra, n. 26.
,"1106 Ohio State 366, 140 N. E. 114 (1922).
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In Edwards v. Slocum, the proper computation of taxes
where the residuary gift is to charity, was again before
the Court. Charitable gifts again were exempt, as they
are today. In order to determine the net estate subject
to tax, the executors naturally deducted from the gross
estate the amount of the charitable gifts, including the
residuary gift, and paid a tax computed on the balance.
The Government contended that since the tax would be
paid from the exempt residue, the amount of the tax should
be added to the net estate, and a tax paid on the tax,
in accordance with an algebraic formula. Although, as
Justice Holmes remarked, "The Government well might
have remained satisfied" with the opinions of the District
Court and the Circuit Court, which were contrary to its
position, it nevertheless carried the case to the Supreme
Court and again was unsuccessful. The significance of the
case lies not so much in the opinion of the Supreme Court,
but in that Court's affirmation of the decision below, in
which the following sentence appeared:50
"So far as the words of this statute are concerned,
the United States does not care who ultimately bears
the weight of this tax; it announces the sum and demands payment from the executors; if the legatees
and devisees cannot agree as to the burden bearing,
the state courts can settle the matter."
Thus it appears that in several cases, Federal Courts
have remarked that Congress is not interested in the incidence of the tax or the place where the burden finally rests.
It is submitted that these dicta do not in any manner imply
that the Courts in question felt that Congress had no power
to legislate on the incidence of the tax. On the contrary,
particularly in view of the decisions in the New York
Trust Company case, and the Knowlton case, these expressions of the Court can only mean that, in the opinion of
the judges, Congress has not acted on the subject.
It is difficult, in view of the express provisions of Section 828(b) and (c), to justify these dicta. Congress has
" Edwards v. Slocum, 287 Fed. 651, 653 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923).
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acted on the subject in no uncertain terms, and its enactment has persisted in the Federal Revenue Laws in practically identical terms since the first estate tax law of
1916. No word, phrase, or sentence can be found in the
Federal Act, indicating an intent on the part of Congress
to defer its effect to the laws of the State. The burden
of the tax is imposed upon the executor and the beneficiary
of life insurance policies without any limitation or qualification whatsoever save the expressed intent of the decedent. If Congress had intended its apportionment act
to occupy a rank below that of the enactments of the
State Legislatures, it could easily have so provided in
the Act. Having made one exception-to wit, the expressed intent of the testator-it seems difficult to imply
another exception-to wit, the intent of the State Legislature-when such further exception could so easily have
been, and was not, expressed. With apologies to A. P.
Herbert, "If Congress did not mean what it said, it ought
to have said so."
VII.

CONCLUSIONS.

Congress has enacted an apportionment-or rather, a
lack of apportionment-statute. That statute is within
its constitutional powers and is designed to be effective
independent of State legislation. The Maryland statute
is in conflict with the Federal enactment, and to the extent
of the conflict, is void because of the supremacy clause
of the Federal Constitution.
While, therefore, the Federal Act is effective and the
Maryland Act is not, the application of the Federal Act
is inequitable and unjust with respect to the beneficiaries
of the estate.
Further, no suggestion has been made that the present
Federal Act has the effect of benefiting any department
of the Federal Government; nor does it seem to have been
designed with any purpose of increasing the eventual
amount of internal revenue taxes or the collectibility of
such taxes. The present Federal Act, therefore, since it
does not react to the benefit of the Federal Government,
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and since in many cases it creates inequities and injustices
among beneficiaries of the decedent's bounty, should be
amended or repealed.
Finally, the Maryland Act tends to provide an equitable
distribution of the tax burden, but it is unnecessarily restricted in its scope and should be extended to cover all
classes of recipients of taxable property.

